China currently possesses three aircraft carriers, and the construction progress of the fourth has become a hot topic of discussion.
One focus of the discussion is: How many aircraft carriers does China actually need?
Some argue that China needs eight aircraft carriers, while others advocate for ten. They provide the following reasons:
1. Since the United States has eleven aircraft carriers, why shouldn't China have at least ten? They believe that a world-class power should have a corresponding number of aircraft carriers.
2. The Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea require aircraft carriers.
3. China's economy is becoming increasingly reliant on maritime transportation, necessitating aircraft carriers to ensure the safety of maritime shipping.
4. With China acquiring more overseas economic interests, there's a need for aircraft carriers to protect these interests.
While the argument "the U.S. has eleven aircraft carriers, so China should have at least ten" may not be entirely sound, some still agree that a world-class power should have a corresponding number of aircraft carriers.
Previously, some believed that "aircraft carriers are a nation's calling card," but more people now realize that China's rise isn't based on calling cards but on actual strength.
The number of aircraft carriers is just a small part of a country's comprehensive strength and only a fraction of its military power, far from being the entirety or even the main part.
If prioritized, for today's China, having the world's most powerful semiconductor industry is more important than having the world's most powerful aircraft carrier force.
While aircraft carriers indeed play a significant role in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, they are not indispensable.
Taiwan is very close to China, well within the combat radius of land-based aircraft, and even circumventing into the Pacific direction is possible.
Therefore, the direct application of aircraft carriers in Taiwan Strait operations is not necessary; their primary role is in isolating the battlefield, but aircraft carriers are not the only tool for isolating the battlefield.
In operations in the South China Sea, aircraft carriers' role is more crucial, but still not indispensable. Otherwise, what would happen in the event of a conflict?
Under conditional circumstances, the Chinese navy needs to maintain one aircraft carrier each in the East China Sea-Western Pacific and the South China Sea-Indian Ocean regions, plus one for maintenance and one as a backup, totaling six.
This ensures that at least four aircraft carriers are available for deployment during wartime, ideally all six.
Supported by submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and land-based aircraft, this would constitute a considerable naval force.
However, even with six aircraft carriers, it's not enough to control the Pacific or the Indian Ocean, let alone penetrate the Atlantic. But is the goal of the Chinese navy to become a global navy?
China has repeatedly stated it doesn't seek global hegemony, which is true.
China's maritime shipping covers corners of the globe, but it's conducted with friendly or even neutral countries, not as colonial shipping from China to overseas territories.
In other words, maritime shipping depends not only on China but also on other countries.
In the event of a world war, how many overseas trading partners can China maintain normal maritime shipping with is a question worth considering.
If other countries refuse trade due to various pressures, related maritime shipping cannot proceed.
There are conventional and unconventional scenarios for maritime blockades.
In a conventional major war, seizing control of the seas is a prerequisite for protecting maritime shipping, but ten aircraft carriers are insufficient to dominate the global seas.
Although oceans cover 70% of the Earth's surface, humans ultimately live on land, so naval warfare revolves around land.
In other words, the ultimate aim of all naval warfare is land, and all naval warfare is affected by land warfare.
In World War II, although the U.S. Navy struck the Japanese Navy, behind naval battles, there were also the arduous island battles fought by the U.S. Marine Corps and support from land-based long-range strike aircraft, not just carriers fighting alone.
The Battle of Midway was fought around Midway Island, the Battle of the Coral Sea was fought around islands in the South Pacific, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf was fought around the Philippine Islands.
Even in the struggle for control of the seas, naval battles are not fleets encountering each other in the depths of the ocean but revolve around islands and coastlines.
Beyond the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, where else does China need to contest? And what is the purpose?
At the tactical level, in naval warfare around China's mainland, China's submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and land-based aircraft are powerful forces supporting carrier operations, capable of flexibly switching between main attacks and assistance.
Similarly, in far-off oceanic naval warfare where the opponent's home is, the opponent can employ similar strategies.
Even if the Chinese navy has ten aircraft carriers, without overseas military presence and bases, it would still be isolated.
In escort operations in irregular warfare, the effectiveness of aircraft carriers is not guaranteed, as seen in the current Red Sea crisis.
The hope of protecting China's overseas interests through aircraft carriers is wishful thinking.
Protecting China's overseas interests with military means on land ultimately requires landing and controlling that land. Carriers alone are not enough, not even with amphibious assault ships and marines.
This is essentially military conquest, and many great powers in history have ultimately been bogged down in overseas military conflicts due to the lure of overseas interests.
At the tactical level, although the carrier-supported amphibious task force can deploy 40-80 fighter jets and a small-scale, rapid intervention force of fewer than 2,000 marines, it's far from enough to conquer a landmass.
Even by American standards, protecting overseas interests isn't solely achievable through carriers.
Reportedly, by the end of 2021, the U.S. had around 115,000 troops stationed worldwide and about 750 military bases of varying sizes.
The U.S. carrier never fights alone but relies on comprehensive strength including regional military presence, political influence, economic power, etc., with carriers being just the most visible part.
If China's overseas interests require carrier protection, it signifies a failed start.
As for whether Chinese carriers need to be nuclear-powered, it's also related to the above.
Nuclear-powered carriers don't depend on fuel, increase onboard aviation fuel and ammunition capacity, though they can't solve the fuel issue for escort fleets, they can alleviate pressure on fleet resupply.
However, the refueling cycle for nuclear-powered carriers lasts for several years, meaning they can't deploy during refueling, greatly affecting carrier availability and wartime deployment rates.
If China's carrier operations mainly focus on the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, nuclear power still has advantages but is not necessary.
In other words, while nuclear-powered carriers are feasible given the circumstances, they're not urgent.
As for the public relations value of nuclear-powered carriers, as mentioned earlier, China has already moved beyond the era of "face first."
In conclusion, China indeed needs carriers, but six are sufficient, and ten are excessive.
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