In history, despite being a land power, Germany actively pursued sea power, especially before World War I, when the German navy was the world's second-largest navy, second only to Britain.
At that time, the German navy had 17 battleships, 5 battlecruisers, 22 pre-dreadnoughts, 7 armored cruisers, as well as light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc., with a total tonnage of 1.3 million tons, which was incredibly powerful.
However, due to Germany's erroneous judgments in diplomatic strategy, this powerful navy failed to win corresponding national interests for Germany and eventually sank, which is regrettable.
In fact, whether in World War I, World War II, or even in the 21st century, Germany's naval strategy has serious flaws.
This article discusses the problems in the design of large warships in the German Navy since modern times, from World War I to World War II, and up to the present.
Firstly, let's look at the problems in the design of large warships in the German Navy before and after World War I, specifically including the following points:
1. Lack of foresight in the development of large-caliber naval guns. Germany had 283mm naval guns, but did not further develop larger-caliber turrets.
As a result, when Britain equipped 343mm and 381mm main guns, Germany realized the need for larger-caliber turrets, but it was too late.
Moreover, Germany's artillery production process was relatively complex, with limited output, resulting in the inability to timely equip turrets for the main ships under construction.
2. Lagging behind in the development of battlecruisers.
Despite discovering through intelligence systems that Britain had designed the "Invincible" class battlecruisers (equipped with 305mm main guns), Germany continued to design outdated "Blücher" class armored cruisers, only equipped with 210mm main guns, and the design plans were delayed for several years, which was a waste of resources and time.
Next, let's look at the problems in the design of large warships in the German Navy before and after World War II, where the problems were more serious:
1. Big ships equipped with small guns, wasting tonnage. For example, the "Bismarck" class battleships had a displacement of up to 50,000 tons, but were only equipped with 8 380mm main guns, when they could have been equipped with larger-caliber turrets.
2. Lack of foresight in the development of large-caliber naval guns still persisted. Germany should have learned lessons from World War I before World War II, but did not accelerate the development of larger-caliber naval guns, instead persisting with 380mm turrets.
Moreover, Germany's 380mm naval guns were far inferior in performance to Britain's 381mm naval guns.
3. Immature technology in triple turrets led to the inability of the "Bismarck" class battleships to be equipped with triple main guns, making the design of armor protection even more difficult.
4. Insufficient horizontal defense design for large warships, with low levels of horizontal armor protection; for example, the "Bismarck" class battleships had relatively thin horizontal armor thicknesses and were easily penetrated by the main guns of new main battleships.
Other German large warships also had similar problems, such as the "Schlachtschiff" class battlecruisers and the "Deutschland" class pocket battleships.
5. Overall protection design lagged behind, resulting in insufficient armor protection for critical parts of large warships, placing them at a disadvantage in one-on-one artillery duels compared to similar types of allied main ships.
German large warships in this regard were clearly inferior to allied main ships of similar types.
In addition to the above problems, German Navy large warships also had other issues, such as high cost and inappropriate engine selection, which are not listed here.
Finally, let's take a look at the problems with German Navy large warships in the 21st century.
The main problem is the mismatch between weapon equipment and tonnage. The scale of warships has exceeded that of frigates, but the weapon equipment is far from sufficient to support their large tonnage.
For example, the F126 class frigate is called a frigate, but its full load displacement is as high as 11,000 tons, yet it is only equipped with limited weapon equipment, far inferior to the "Mogami" class frigates of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force with similar tonnage.
In conclusion, "It takes ten years to sharpen a sword, but a hundred years to forge a navy." However, Germany's naval construction since modern times has repeatedly hit pitfalls, indicating that naval construction still needs to draw on traditional experiences and lessons.
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