Since the United States revised its semiconductor industry rules in May 2020, the "chip war" between China and the United States has been ongoing for four years.
The latest statement from ASML has intensified this conflict, potentially making the U.S. the ultimate loser.
To maintain its technological dominance, the U.S. has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on Huawei since December 2018, with increasingly severe measures.
Initially, the U.S. exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction to arrest Meng Wanzhou and spread unsubstantiated rumors internationally about "security backdoors" in Huawei equipment. Through military and economic pressure, it forced allies to prevent Huawei from entering their 5G markets.
The U.S. even disrupted the global semiconductor industry balance, amending rules to prohibit manufacturers like TSMC and Samsung from producing Huawei's Kirin chips.
As a leader in the semiconductor industry, the U.S. holds many core technologies and wields significant influence.
However, despite the tight technological blockade by the U.S. and its allies, Huawei has made significant breakthroughs.
In August of last year, Huawei launched the Mate 60 series smartphone featuring the Kirin 9000S chip, breaking through the U.S. blockade.
The release of Huawei's Pura 70 marked the ineffectiveness of the U.S. chip ban.
The return of Huawei's Kirin chips has led many experts to believe that the U.S. should recognize the rise of China's semiconductor industry and adjust its strategy to end this "chip war" with no winners.
However, the U.S. has not changed its approach and recently revoked the chip export licenses of Qualcomm and Intel to Huawei, severing these companies' ties with Huawei completely.
Currently, Qualcomm, Intel, and Nvidia have all ceased cooperation with Huawei.
Although the latest sanctions are harsher than before, their impact on Huawei is limited.
Huawei announced last year that it would no longer purchase Qualcomm chips, fully switching to Kirin chips, a promise it has fulfilled.
For Intel, Huawei can opt for self-developed chips or domestic alternatives like Loongson.
Instead, U.S. sanctions are accelerating the development of domestic chips and operating systems in China.
The chip blockade is a double-edged sword; while it can slow down the growth of Chinese companies like Huawei, it also leads to significant losses for U.S. companies like Qualcomm.
Four years ago, the Chinese government mandated achieving 70% chip self-sufficiency within five years, implementing various incentives such as ten-year tax exemptions for semiconductor-related enterprises.
Domestic companies have responded by investing heavily in the semiconductor sector.
According to media reports, China now possesses the capability to manufacture chips with 7nm and higher process technologies, with daily production exceeding 1 billion chips, and export volumes continually increasing.
With the rise of domestic chips, SMIC's orders mostly come from domestic clients, even catching TSMC off guard.
TSMC's president personally visited these clients, but to no avail.
The rise of domestic chips has directly impacted the market demand for U.S. chips.
Customs data show that in the past 18 months, China's chip imports decreased by 192 billion units, with the most significant drop seen in U.S. chips.
The current issue is no longer whether the U.S. is willing to sell, but whether China needs to buy, as domestic alternatives have become a trend.
The U.S. has not given up resistance; last year, President Biden signed the "CHIPS Act," promising $52 billion in subsidies to companies like TSMC and Samsung for setting up plants in the U.S., but these companies are not eager to receive the subsidies.
For instance, TSMC has stated that if the U.S. does not amend certain terms, it will abandon applying for the subsidies.
This means that if the U.S. does not give up its plan to transform TSMC into an "American TSMC," TSMC will no longer help enhance U.S. chip manufacturing capabilities.
Furthermore, U.S. sanctions on Huawei have also raised global awareness, prompting many countries to invest heavily in building their semiconductor supply chains.
For example, South Korea is set to establish a large chip cluster in Seoul, with investments exceeding $500 billion.
Europe has also formed the European Chips Alliance to reduce reliance on imported chips.
The U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association predicts that China will invest $142 billion to boost its domestic semiconductor industry.
In reality, the China-U.S. dynamic has formed a "the U.S. won't sell, and China won't buy" scenario across multiple fields, achieving self-sufficiency in many areas.
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